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Abstract Previous work showed that language has an
important function for the development of action control.
This study examined the role of verbal processes for
action–effect learning in 4-year-old children. Participants
performed an acquisition phase including a two-choice
key-pressing task in which each key press (action) was
followed by a particular sound (effect). Children were
instructed to either (1) label their actions along with the
corresponding effects, (2) verbalize task-irrelevant words,
(3) or perform without verbalization. In a subsequent test
phase, they responded to the same sound effects either
under consistent or under inconsistent sound-key map-
pings. Evidence for action–effect learning was obtained
only if action and effects were labeled or if no verbaliza-
tion was performed, but not if children verbalized task-
irrelevant labels. Importantly, action–effect learning was
mostpronouncedwhenchildrenverbalizedtheactionsandthe
corresponding effects, suggesting that task-relevant verbal
labeling supports the integration of event representations.
Introduction
‘‘If I hit the brake, then my car will slow down’’—learning
this type of simple association between an action and its
effect forms the basis for goal-directed behavioral activity
and is essential for mastering the challenges of our daily
lives. According to ideomotor approaches to action con-
trol (e.g., Greenwald, 1970; Hommel, 1996; Hommel,
Mu ¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; James, 1890;
Stock & Stock, 2004), performing a given action, such as a
certain movement, automatically results in an association
between the motor pattern producing the movement
(m) and its sensory effects (e). The theory of action–effect
learning (Elsner & Hommel, 2001) assumes that these
associations are bidirectional (m $ e), suggesting that one
can use them to control one’s motor behavior by mentally
anticipating the effect of a given action. That is, once I
know that hitting the break will slow down my car
(m ? e), the intention of slowing down (which re-activates
e) will prompt me to hit the break by priming the associ-
ated action (e ? m).
Adults indeed acquire and use bidirectional action-out-
come contingencies to plan and guide their actions (for
reviews, see Hommel, 2009; Hommel & Elsner, 2009), but
only a few studies focused on action–effect learning in
childhood, where the acquisition of novel action–effect
contingencies seems particularly important. In one study, 4
and 7-year-olds performed in two successive experimental
phases (Eenshuistra, Weidema, & Hommel, 2004): In a
ﬁrst acquisition phase, they carried out free-choice
responses by pressing one of two response keys (m1 and
m2) in each trial. Each key press triggered a distinct
auditory effect (i.e., one of two sounds; m1 ? e1,
m2 ? e2). In a second test phase, children ﬁrst heard the
sound and then responded by pressing one of the response
keys. Importantly, the assignment of response keys to
sounds was either consistent (e1 ? m1, e2 ? m2)o r
inconsistent (e1 ? m2, e2 ? m1) with the sound-key
mapping in the acquisition phase. Results on the level of
reaction times showed that children in the consistent
mapping condition outperformed those in the inconsistent
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tency effect). However, on the level of response accuracy,
the mapping consistency effect was much more pro-
nounced in the 4-year-olds than in the 7-year-olds
(cf. Eenshuistra, Verschoor, Kray, & Hommel, 2009; Kray,
Eenshuistra, Kerstner, Weidema, & Hommel, 2006), indi-
cating that younger children were less efﬁcient in over-
writing previously learned action–effect associations in
order to maintain and implement a new set of task rules in
the test phase. Based on these ﬁndings, one goal of the
present study was to provide further evidence for action–
effect learning in childhood.
Our second and more important focus was on the role of
language in the acquisition of action–effect associations.
Ever since the early work of Vygotsky (1962), researchers
have emphasized the importance of language for the
development of action control (e.g., Luria, 1960, 1969;
Meacham, 1979). Their ﬁndings are compatible with more
recent frameworks that highlight the important role of
language for the regulation of behavioral activity. The
cognitive complexity and control theory (Zelazo & Frye,
1997), for instance, assumes that language is the medium
for rule use. That is, formulating rules in natural language
allows children to access and focus on particular pieces of
knowledge when performing tasks. Accordingly, Zelazo
(1999, 2004) assumes that language serves two distinct
functions in the development of action control: When
children start talking, they begin to label and name previ-
ous perceptions and the outcome of behavioral activity.
These semantic descriptions can outlive and exist inde-
pendently of the respective sensory data and thus support
the maintenance of enduring memory traces in working
memory (constitutive function). Once an event is repre-
sented in working memory, the retrieval of its label may
trigger action schemata without external stimulation
(executive function). With increasing age, children learn to
use this mechanism for action regulation. Similarly,
Gentner assumes that language has an important function
for cognitive development because the use of common
labels for distinct instances of a category and the acquisi-
tion of words for relations support the development
of increasingly complex relations (e.g., Gentner &
Loewenstein, 2002; Gentner & Medina, 1998). Taken toge-
ther, these models suggest that language can support the
integration of relationships between events (cf. Hermer-
Vasquez, Spelke, & Katsnelson, 1999) and facilitate the
bindingofactionstotheireffects(i.e.,action–effectlearning).
Consistent with these theoretical assumptions, a number
of recent empirical studies indicate that children and adults
can indeed employ verbal processes to support the retrieval
and maintenance of task goals, action sequences, and if–
then rules (e.g., Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001;
Bryck & Mayr, 2005; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Goschke,
2000; Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Kray, Eber, &
Karbach, 2008; Kray, Eber, & Lindenberger, 2004;M u ¨ller,
Zelazo, Hood, Leone, & Rohrer, 2004; Towse, Redbond,
Houston-Price, & Cook, 2000).
A previous study of ours has examined the role of verbal
labeling for the acquisition of action–effect associations in
4-year-old preschoolers (Kray et al., 2006). Similar to
previous studies (e.g., Eenshuistra et al., 2004), children
performed in an acquisition phase and a test phase. In the
acquisition phase, they responded to the faces of Ernie and
Bert from the popular TV show ‘‘Sesame Street’’ by freely
choosing a blue or a green response button as soon as
Ernie’s face appeared on the screen. Pressing one of the
keys was followed by a trumpet sound, while pressing
the other resulted in a bell sound. Children carried out the
acquisition phase under one of four verbalization condi-
tions: The action group named their actions, that is, they
labeled which response button they had pressed (e.g.,
‘‘blue’’). The effect group named the effect of their action,
that is, the sound it induced (e.g., ‘‘trumpet’’). The
action ? effect group labeled both the action and its effect
(e.g., ‘‘green-bell’’), while a fourth group verbalized words
that were unrelated to the action and the effect (predicting
what Ernie liked for lunch, ‘‘pizza’’ or ‘‘spaghetti’’). In the
test phase, half of each verbalization group was tested
under a consistent or inconsistent sound-response button
mapping. Accuracy data showed that naming one part of
the action–effect pair (i.e., action-only or effect-only) did
not allow for action–effect learning while naming both the
action and the effect did. This suggests that naming only
one member of the action–effect pair attracts attention to
this member to the expense of the other, thereby preventing
the acquisition of their relationship. In contrast, verbally
relating effects to the corresponding action seems to
support the integration of this event.
Although these results point to an important role of
verbal labeling in action–effect learning, the study of Kray
et al. also yielded an unexpected result: Children per-
forming under task-irrelevant verbalization did not perform
statistically different from the children in the ‘‘action ?
effect’’ condition. Thus, instead of disrupting inner speech
and thereby impairing action–effect learning, task-irrele-
vant verbalization still allowed for the acquisition of
action–effect associations. One possible explanation of this
ﬁnding is that the exact nature of the verbalization may be
less relevant, as long as it attracts attention to the relation
between action and effect. If this were true, choosing the
words ‘‘pizza’’ and ‘‘spaghetti’’ as task-irrelevant verbali-
zation may not have been ideal: Though these words were
neither directly related to the actions nor their effects, the
cover story did provide a general link between the ver-
balizations and the stimuli because the children were told
to guess Ernie’s lunch. One way to test whether this link
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ciations would be to apply a different type of task-irrele-
vant verbalization, such as randomly created non-words
completely unrelated to the task, the stimuli, and the
instructions. Another issue that hampers the interpretation
of the Kray et al. study is that it included both a task-
relevant and a task-irrelevant verbalization condition, but
no baseline condition without verbalization. Accordingly,
it is hard to disentangle the relative contributions of both
types of verbalization and to determine whether action–
effect learning would have occured without verbalization
in this paradigm (cf. Eenshuistra et al., 2004; Elsner &
Hommel, 2001).
Thus, the purpose of the present study was twofold:
Firstly, to investigate the inﬂuence of task-relevant
(action ? effect) and task-irrelevant verbalization on
action–effect learning. In contrast to our previous study
(Kray et al., 2006), we chose meaningless non-words as
task-irrelevant verbalization in order to make sure that they
were neither related to the task nor particularly attracting
the children’s attention to any relevant task features. Our
second goal was to examine the acquisition of action–effect
associations under a control condition without verbaliza-
tion, allowing the assessment of children’s performance
under both the task-relevant and the task-irrelevant ver-
balization relative to a baseline condition without verbali-
zation, so that the effects of both types of verbalization
on action–effect learning can be assessed independently.
Since action control can be supported by task-relevant
verbalization (Kray et al., 2006, 2008) and impaired
by task-irrelevant verbalization (e.g. Baddeley et al., 2001;
Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Kray et al., 2008), we expected
action–effect learning (i.e., the mapping consistency effect)
to be more pronounced under the task-relevant verbaliza-
tion than under the control condition, and less pronounced
under the task-irrelevant verbalization than under the
control condition. As previous studies have suggested that
accuracy measures are more sensitive to action–effect
acquisition in children than reaction times are, we will
focus on accuracy, but will also report reaction times.
Method
Participants
110 four-year-old children recruited from four kindergar-
tens in South Germany participated in the study. Exclusion
criteria were motor impairments and developmental dis-
orders reported by parents and kindergarten teachers.
Children suffering from myopia (n = 8) wore corrective
glasses while performing the experimental tasks. Twenty
children had to be excluded from the analysis because they
either did not ﬁnish the experiment (n = 4), were not able
to perform the color naming test (see below) (n = 4), or
responded at chance level in the testing phase (n = 12),
yielding a ﬁnal sample of 90 children (see Table 1). The
children received small presents for participating, and the
kindergartens were given money to buy games (total
amount per child: 6 EUR/*8 USD).
Stimuli and apparatus
We used a notebook computer for data collection and
stimulus presentation. The faces of Ernie and Bert from the
TV show ‘‘Sesame Street’’ served as visual stimuli. A left
and a right response key on an external response box
registered manual responses. Since 4-year-olds did not
have a clear representation of ‘‘left’’ and ‘‘right’’, the
response buttons were color-tagged and referred to as the
‘‘green’’ and the ‘‘blue’’ button. The mapping of the colors
to the left and right response button was counterbalanced
across subjects. Auditory stimuli consisted of the sounds of
a bell and a trumpet.
Design and procedure
The experiment was divided into an acquisition phase and a
test phase. In the acquisition phase, the children were to
press one of the two response keys as quickly as possible
when Ernie appeared. They were instructed to choose the
keys freely but to use them about equally often. Pressing
one of the response keys was followed by a bell sound
(m1 ? e1) and pressing the other one by a trumpet sound
(m2 ? e2), that is, each sound effect was induced by a
distinct motor action. The mapping of the two response
buttons to the two sounds was counterbalanced across
subjects. In order to motivate the children to complete the
acquisition phase, the experiment was set up as a game.
The children were told to respond to the appearance of
Ernie because he would like to play the game (go trials),
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the participants
Statistic Verbalization group
Relevant Irrelevant Control
n 31 29 30
% female 54.8 48.3 66.7
Age range (years) 4.00–4.11 4.00–4.11 4.00–4.11
Mean age (years) 4.51 (0.3) 4.48 (0.4) 4.54 (0.4)
Color-naming test
Consistent mapping group 17.9 (6.8) 17.9 (7.0) 16.1 (7.1)
Inconsistent mapping group 18.6 (5.5) 21.5 (5.4) 18.8 (6.7)
Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. The color-naming
test score refers to the number of correctly named colors within 45 s
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123but not to respond to Bert because he does not like to play
(no-go trials).
The acquisition phase consisted of 144 trials (96 go- and
48 no-go trials) separated into three blocks. Each acquisi-
tion trial started after an inter-trial interval of 1,500 ms.
The go-stimulus remained on the screen for 7,000 ms or
until a response was made. The sound effects lasted for
250 ms. Their frequency slightly varied across participants
(depending on how often they pressed each of the response
keys), but it was equally distributed in all experimental
conditions (see Table 2). The no-go stimulus remained on
the screen for about 2,000 ms. While performing the
acquisition phase, participants were divided into three
verbalization groups. In the task-relevant verbalization
group, the children named both the effect and the action
producing it (e.g., ‘‘green-trumpet’’/‘‘blue-bell’’). Children
in the task-irrelevant verbalization group verbalized non-
words (i.e., ‘‘bababu’’/‘‘dododi’’) that were unrelated to the
action and its effect. Finally, the third group served as a
control condition without verbalization.
In the test phase, each of the three groups was randomly
split: One half of the participants performed with an
acquisition-consistent sound-key mapping and the other
half with an acquisition-inconsistent sound-key mapping.
Under the consistent mapping, children worked with the
same action–effect assignment as in the acquisition phase
but in the reversed order, so that they now pressed the key
in response to the sound that this key previously had pro-
duced (i.e., m1 ? e1, m2 ? e2 in the acquisition phase
would yield the mapping e1 ? m1, e2 ? m2 in the test
phase). Under inconsistent mapping, the sound-key
assignment from the acquisition phase was inverted (i.e.,
m1 ? e1, m2 ? e2 in the acquisition phase would yield the
mapping e1 ? m2, e2 ? m1). Children were told that Ernie
likes to make music, so they should press one key when
they heard the sound of the trumpet and the other key when
they heard the sound of the bell. Again, they were to
withhold responding when Bert appeared, because ‘‘Bert
does not like music and prefers the silence.’’
The test phase consisted of three blocks of 24 go- and 6
no-go trials. The trial procedure was identical to the acqui-
sition phase. Consistent with previous studies (Eenshuistra
et al., 2004; Kray et al., 2006), the response keys triggered
the corresponding sounds in both the acquisition phase and
the test phase to avoid extinction of the action–effect asso-
ciations (see Elsner & Hommel, 2001).
The test sessions took approximately 40 min per child,
including short breaks between color-naming test (see
below), acquisition phase, and test phase.
Matching procedure
To avoid pre-existing group differences in verbal speed,
children were matched to the three verbalization groups
based on the results of a color-naming test. In this test, the
children saw a sheet with a template in the top row
assigning four different colors to four different shapes
(yellow circle, blue cross, red triangle, and green square).
Twenty-four uncolored shapes were shown below the
template. Children were instructed to name the corre-
sponding colors as quickly and accurately as possible. The
test score was the number of correctly named colors after
45 s.
Verbal speed
Table 1 shows the mean number of correctly named colors
for the three verbalization groups. Analysis of variance
(ANOVA) including the between-subjects factors verbali-
zation group (relevant/irrelevant/control) and mapping
group (consistent/inconsistent) revealed that neither the
main effects nor their interaction reached signiﬁcance (all
p’s[0.10), showing that the groups did not differ signif-
icantly in their speed of verbal responding.
Acquisition phase
Left and right key presses were equally distributed in each
of the three groups (see Table 2). ANOVA based on mean
reaction times (RT) with the within-subjects factor key
press (left/right) and the between-subjects factor verbali-
zation group (relevant/irrelevant/control) showed that
children generally responded somewhat faster with the
right hand than with the left hand, F(1, 84) = 4.98,
p\0.05, g
2 = 0.05, but that latencies for the three ver-
balization groups were comparable, and that there was no
interaction between key side and verbalization group.
Test phase
Mean error rates and RT of correct responses were ana-
lyzed by means of ANOVAs with the between-subjects
Table 2 Frequencies and latencies for left and right key presses in
the acquisition phase
Key press Verbalization group
Relevant Irrelevant Control
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Frequencies (%)
Left 48.2 (2.5) 46.9 (4.2) 47.4 (3.5)
Right 47.2 (2.4) 48.7 (4.1) 47.6 (3.3)
Latencies (ms)
Left 1,728 (412) 1,580 (332) 1,472 (397)
Right 1,675 (392) 1,539 (375) 1,411 (382)
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and mapping group (consistent/inconsistent).
Error rates
We found a main effect of mapping group, F(1, 84) =
20.86, p\0.0001, g
2 = 0.17, pointing to higher error rates
under the inconsistent-mapping condition than under the
consistent-mapping condition, and an interaction between
mapping group and verbalization group, F(1, 84) = 4.27,
p\0.05, g
2 = 0.07, but no main effect for verbalization
group (p = 0.22). In order to test whether the mapping-
consistency effect reached signiﬁcance under each one of
the three verbalization conditions, we ran individual anal-
yses for each of them, revealing reliable mapping-consis-
tency effects in the task-relevant verbalization group and
in the control group (F(1, 29) = 24.77, p\0.0001,
g
2 = 0.46, and F(1, 28) = 5.06, p\0.05, g
2 = 0.15,
respectively) but not in the task-irrelevant verbalization
group (p = 0.41). Importantly, pairwise comparisons
indicated that the mapping-consistency effect was larger in
the task-relevant verbalization condition than in the task-
irrelevant condition and the control condition (F(1, 56) =
7.42, p\0.01, g
2 = 0.12, and F(1, 57) = 4.41, p\0.05,
g
2 = 0.07, respectively), but there was no difference
between the task-irrelevant condition and the control con-
dition (p = 0.42) (see Fig. 1, upper panel).
Latencies
A main effect for mapping group, F(1, 84) = 4.31,
p\0.05, g
2 = 0.05, showed that children responded
slower under the inconsistent-mapping than under the
consistent-mapping condition (see Fig. 1, lower panel).
However, neither the main effect for verbalization group
nor the interaction with mapping reached signiﬁcance
(p = 0.92 and p = 0.76, respectively), ruling a speed-
accuracy trade-off as explanation for the pattern of results
on the level of error rates out.
1
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of
verbal processes in the acquisition of action–effect asso-
ciations in 4-year-old children. Speciﬁcally, we tested
whether different types of verbalization (task-relevant,
task-irrelevant, no verbalization) performed during an
acquisition phase modulated the occurrence of action–
effect learning (i.e., the mapping-consistency effect) in a
test phase. Similar to our previous studies (Eenshuistra
et al., 2004; Eenshuistra et al., 2009; Kray et al., 2006),
effects were most signiﬁcant on the level of accuracy,
Fig. 1 Proportion of errors (upper panel) and mean reaction times
(lower panel) as a function of verbalization group (relevant,
irrelevant, control) and mapping condition (consistent, inconsistent).
Error bars refer to standard errors of the mean. Signiﬁcant between-
group differences with respect to consistency effects are highlighted
1 Although we found no signiﬁcant pre-experimental group differ-
ences in verbal speed, one may argue that the children in the
consistent mapping group generally tended to verbalize faster than
those in the inconsistent mapping group. In order to make sure that
this tendency did not account for the group differences found in the
test phase, we performed two control analyses in which we included
the color-naming score as a covariate into the two-way ANOVA with
the between-subjects factors verbalization group (relevant/irrelevant/
control) and mapping group (consistent/inconsistent). We found no
signiﬁcant effect for verbal speed on the level of latencies (p = 0.53).
Though the effect reached signiﬁcance with respect to error rates, F(1,
84) = 4.60, p\0.05, g
2 = 0.05, the pattern of results did not
change.
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reaction times in preschool-aged children (for a review, see
Diamond & Kirkham, 2005). Overall, our present ﬁndings
suggest two novel insights.
First, although action–effect learning occurred in the
absence of any verbalization, it was particularly pronounced
under the task-relevant verbalization. This pattern provides
clear evidence for the acquisition of bidirectional action–
effect associations in preschoolers under ‘‘standard’’ condi-
tionswithoutverbalization,supportingideomotorapproaches
to action control in general and Elsner and Hommel’s theory
ofaction–effectlearning(2001)inparticular.Importantly,our
data also provide evidence for the view that task-relevant
verbalization supports action control in childhood (cf. Kray
etal.,2006,2008).Thatis,ifchildrenverbalizedtheir actions
andthecorrespondingeffects,therebyverballyconnectingthe
two most relevant aspects of the task, the acquisition of
action–effect associations was particularly supported. This
ﬁnding is consistent with a recent study investigating the role
of verbal processes for feature binding in 4-year-olds
(Dessalegn & Landau, 2008). In this study, children were
shownatarget(e.g.,asplitsquare,redontheleftandgreenon
the right). After a brief delay, the participants saw a display
includingthetarget,itsreﬂection,andasquarewithadifferent
geometric splitandtheywereinstructedtoidentifythe target.
Resultsshowedthatchildrenfailedtomaintaincolor-location
conjunctions, but that performance improved when targets
were accompanied by a verbal cue specifying the relation
between the color and the direction (e.g., ‘‘the red is on the
left’’), while no such improvements were found with non-
linguistic cues (e.g., pointing). On a more general note, our
results support accounts stressing the importance of verbal
processes for the integration of different sources of informa-
tion into one coherent representation (e.g., Hermer-Vazquez
et al., 1999), the organization of temporal relations between
stimuli and the corresponding motor responses (e.g., Zelazo,
1999),andthesequencingofgoal-directedbehavioralactivity
(e.g., Bryck & Mayr, 2005).
Second, while action–effect learning was found under
task-relevant verbalization and in the control condition, it
did not occur under task-irrelevant verbalization. Thus, in
contrast to our previous study (Kray et al., 2006), sup-
pressing inner speech by means of task-irrelevant verbali-
zation did impair the acquisition of action–effect
associations, suggesting that children strongly rely on
verbal processes to integrate relations between events (cf.
Zelazo, 1999, 2004). This result is consistent with previous
evidence provided by Kray et al. (2008). In their study,
they examined the role of language in task-switching per-
formance in children, younger adults and older adults.
While switching from one task to another, participants
either engaged in task-relevant verbalization (labeling the
next task goal), task-irrelevant verbalization (supposed to
disrupt inner speech), or did not verbalize at all. Task-
switching was facilitated by task-relevant verbalization,
particularly in children and older adults, and hampered by
task-irrelevant verbalization, which points to the impor-
tance of verbal processes in selecting task goals and
maintaining action sequences (cf. Baddeley et al., 2001;
Bryck & Mayr, 2005; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Goschke,
2000; Kirkham et al., 2003; Kray et al., 2008, 2004;M u ¨ller
et al., 2004; Towse et al., 2000).
So why did our previous study show action–effect
learning even under task-irrelevant verbalization? Consid-
ering the speciﬁc nature of the verbalization (guessing what
Ernie liked for lunch), it seems likely that even the very
general link between the stimuli and the task-irrelevant
verbalization in this study facilitated action–effect learn-
ing. This ﬁnding has important implications for under-
standing the role of verbal processes in action control
because it suggests that aside from facilitating the inte-
gration of relationships between events, language can also
have a more general function that primarily serves to
redirect and focus attention to the task (cf. Karbach &
Kray, 2007; Kirkham et al., 2003;M u ¨ller et al., 2004;
Towse et al., 2000; Vygotsky, 1962), even if it does not
explicitly stress the relationship between the most relevant
task features (such as an action and its effect). In fact, this
interpretation is consistent with the cognitive control and
complexity theory which assumes that verbal processes can
serve to facilitate higher-order rule use, but also support the
refocusing of children’s attention in the absence of higher-
order rules. According to Jacques and Zelazo (2005), the
effects of language are limited to refocusing attention in
3-year-olds. At the age of four, however, it can indeed
support the integration of conﬂicting stimulus dimensions
and relations between events.
Taken together, our present results suggest that the
interplay between language and action control is complex
and operating on multiple levels; that is, language can
serve different functions in order to regulate behavioral
activity (cf. Dessalegn & Landau, 2008; Luria, 1969;
Jaques & Zelazo, 2005; Zelazo, 1999, 2004). Future studies
need to disentangle the speciﬁc function of different types
of task-related verbalization for different components of
action planning and behavioral control, and to determine to
which degree these mechanisms are subject to age-related
changes during childhood. In sum, our ﬁndings suggest that
action–effect learning in early childhood is strongly med-
iated by verbal processes and that it can be supported by
means of task-relevant verbalization relating actions and
the corresponding effects. These effects indicate that lan-
guage can serve as useful tool for (re)directing attention to
relevant task features and for implementing and applying
task representations in order to plan and guide behavior in
preschoolers.
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